fix(security): sanitize file paths in agent-state and skills-remove endpoints (#60)

Co-authored-by: Shams <shams@openclaw.dev>

package-lock.json

@@ -5991,7 +5991,6 @@
       "version": "2.3.2",
       "resolved": "https://registry.npmjs.org/fsevents/-/fsevents-2.3.2.tgz",
       "integrity": "sha512-xiqMQR4xAeHTuB9uWm+fFRcIOgKBMiOBP+eXiyT7jsgVCq1bkVygt00oASowB7EdtpOHaaPgKt812P9ab+DDKA==",
-      "dev": true,
       "hasInstallScript": true,
       "license": "MIT",
       "optional": true,

src/lib/agent-state/local.ts

@@ -83,10 +83,14 @@ export const restoreAgentStateLocally = (params: {
   }
 
   const base = resolveStateDir();
+  const trashRoot = path.join(base, "trash", "studio-delete-agent");
   if (!fs.existsSync(trashDirRaw)) {
     throw new Error(`trashDir does not exist: ${trashDirRaw}`);
   }
-  const { resolvedCandidate: resolvedTrashDir } = ensureUnderBase(base, trashDirRaw);
+  // Validate trashDir is strictly under the expected trash root, not just anywhere under base.
+  // This prevents path traversal where an attacker could reference legitimate directories
+  // (e.g. base/agents/) as a "trashDir" and cause unintended file moves.
+  const { resolvedCandidate: resolvedTrashDir } = ensureUnderBase(trashRoot, trashDirRaw);
 
   const moves: GatewayAgentStateMove[] = [];
   const restoreIfExists = (src: string, dest: string) => {

src/lib/skills/remove-local.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ import fs from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
 
-import { resolveUserPath } from "@/lib/clawdbot/paths";
+import { resolveStateDir, resolveUserPath } from "@/lib/clawdbot/paths";
 import type { RemovableSkillSource, SkillRemoveRequest, SkillRemoveResult } from "@/lib/skills/types";
 
 const resolveComparablePath = (input: string): string => {
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@ export const removeSkillLocally = (params: SkillRemoveRequest): SkillRemoveResul
   const workspaceDir = normalizeRequiredPath(params.workspaceDir, "workspaceDir");
   const managedSkillsDir = normalizeRequiredPath(params.managedSkillsDir, "managedSkillsDir");
 
+  // Security: validate that workspaceDir and managedSkillsDir are under the
+  // server-side state directory. Without this check, an attacker can supply
+  // arbitrary values for these fields, effectively controlling the "allowed root"
+  // and bypassing the isPathInside containment check below.
+  const stateDir = resolveStateDir();
+  if (!isPathInside(stateDir, workspaceDir)) {
+    throw new Error(`workspaceDir is not under the state directory: ${workspaceDir}`);
+  }
+  if (!isPathInside(stateDir, managedSkillsDir)) {
+    throw new Error(`managedSkillsDir is not under the state directory: ${managedSkillsDir}`);
+  }
+
   const allowedRoot = resolveAllowedRoot({
     source,
     workspaceDir,